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Weinrib: Thinking About Tort Law

THINKING ABOUT TORT LAW
ERNEST J. WENRI
Tort law is a body of thought as well as an ensemble of norms. To ask,
therefore, how tort law ought to develop or be reformed is to ask how we are
to think about tort law. How we think about tort law is the subject of my
remarks today.
I want to distinguish two conceptions of tort law: the relational and the
instrumental. The instrumental conception has struck particularly deep roots in
the tort jurisprudence of the United States. The relational conception, now in
the eclipse in this country, thrives elsewhere in the common law world.
To illustrate the distinction between the relational and the instrumental
conceptions, I propose to review an old controversy. In his illuminating history
of modem American tort law, George Priest has described the decisive influence
of Fleming James, Jr.' An early incident in James' academic career, his
exchange with Charles 0. Gregory concerning contribution between
tortfeasors, 2 features powerful statements of these different conceptions.
One can think of tort law in two ways. The first way focuses on the
relationship between the parties. Tort law features a claim that one party is
entitled as of right to the liability of the other. The relational view concentrates
on the normative bond that marks the particular parties off from the rest of the
world and joins them in a legal relationship. In this view, tort doctrines and
principles are sound to the extent that their justifications coherently single out
and connect the specific parties. The relational view starts with the relationship
of the parties to the litigation and asks how we can construe that relationship as
a normatively significant unit. If we cannot so construe it, the claim fails,
because there is no moral ground for linking the liability of this particular party
to the entitlement of that one.

Professor of Law, University of Toronto.

1. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History ofthe Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEoAL STUD. 461 (1985).
2. Fleming James, Contribution Among Joint Torrfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HAM.
L. REV. 1156 (1941) [hereinafter James, Criticism]; Charles 0. Gregory, Contribution Among Joint

Tonfeasors,; A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1170 (1941) [hereinafter Gregory, Defense]; Fleming
James, Replication, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1178 (1941) [hereinafter Replication) Charles 0. Gregory,
Rejoinder, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1184 (1941).
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The second way is to conceive of tort law instrumentally, as the means for
accomplishing collective goals. The task then is to formulate the goals,
elucidate their justifications, and show how they operate in the context of tort
litigation.
An outstanding and influential example of the goal-oriented approach is
Fleming James' idea of loss distribution. Throughout his writings, James
maintained that accidents cause less social disutility the wider their costs are
dissipated. He therefore favored liability rules that spread losses as broadly and
thinly as possible. For James, the goal of loss distribution entailed the extension
of liability, so that defendants would spread the loss through their insurance and
through the consequent increase in the price of their products.
In his controversy with Gregory, James applied this approach to the
problem of multiple tortfeasors. Gregory recommended abandoning the common
law bar against contribution in favor of a rule that subjected each tortfeasor to
contribution in proportion to fault. This, Gregory thought, would obviate the
injustice of allowing the plaintiff to bring liability home to one tortfeasor while
letting the others escape. For James, however, the common law rule, whatever
its historical rationale, had the advantage of promoting broad loss distribution.
In choosing among possible defendants intelligently, self-interested plaintiffs
tended to sue rich or insured tortfeasors, who were strategically placed to
distribute losses broadly. To James, Gregory's proposal had the fatal weakness
of allowing these tortfeasors, in turn, to shift losses to tortfeasors less able to
spread them.
Priest reads this exchange as hoisting Gregory on his own petard.
According to Priest, Gregory's purpose was to change the common law by
introducing a superior loss-spreading rule, which allowed any single tortfeasor
to distribute losses to the other tortfeasors. James' point was that in fact the
common law rule spread losses more effectively than Gregory's proposed
substitute. In Priest's words, "James had simply thought through the problem
more thoroughly and had accurately described the implications of Gregory's own
3
approach."
In my view, this interpretation is incorrect. James and Gregory, far from
proceeding from a common premise, presupposed radically different conceptions
of tort law. James wanted tort law to give effect to the goal of loss distribution.
Gregory wanted tort law to respect the normative relationship between multiple
tortfeasors. The contest between them was a contest between these two
contrasting conceptions.

3. Priest, supra note 1, at 475.
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The true premise of Gregory's proposal was that their common liability to
the victim creates a juridical relationship among multiple tortfeasors. His
question was: what legal doctrine is required by the logic of the tortfeasors'
relationship? Contribution, he explained, "presupposes a common burden or
incubus resting upon all members of a group, more than his share of which one
of such members has discharged for the benefit of all. "4 By allowing one
tortfeasor to be compelled to discharge the liability shared by others, the
common law bar against contribution worked an unjust enrichment. Gregory
proposed that a burden resting on all should be borne by all.
Gregory and James divided not on the desirability of loss distribution but
on the connection between that goal and tort liability. Gregory argued that,
within the relationship among tortfeasors created by tort liability, the common
law bar against contribution works injustice even if it forwards James' goal. In
Gregory's view, no matter how laudable the goal, tort law was not its proper
context. James, on the other hand, gave priority to the goal and saw in tort law
the opportunity to give it at least a limited effect. Gregory measured the goal
by the relationship; James made the relationship subservient to the goal.
The Gregory-James controversy features a goal that few scholars today
would promote with James' uncompromising fervour.
Nonetheless, the
significance of the controversy transcends their specific dispute. James'
argument exemplifies the instrumentalism that over the last half-century has
triumphed in American tort thinking. In contrast, Gregory's approach is
standard in the non-instrumental thinking still widespread elsewhere in the
common law world. (This is hardly surprising: Gregory used Canadian and
English law reform statutes as the models for his own proposal). The
implications of this dispute are worth keeping in mind as we consider the future
of tort reform.
James projected the tough-mindedness of the Yale realist. While conceding
that the contribution proposal coherently developed the principle of fault
liability, he considered it a misplaced aestheticism that elevated "theoretical
symmetry"' over social utility. He portrayed Gregory as the champion of logic
over life: Gregory's "quixotic" proposal "sacrifice[d] good sense to a syllogism
- and an outworn syllogism at that."6 As for his own mission, James described
it in stirring language: "I must look behind the trappings of verbiage and
rationalization to see how the rule is really working out, how it affects litigants

4. Charles 0. Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L.
REV. 365, 369.
5. James, Criticism, supra note 2, at 1169.
6. James, Replication, supra note 2, at 1183.
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singly and in the mass, where its incidence truly is. " '
Gregory's position was a set of nuances with which James had no patience.
First, Gregory supported loss distribution as a goal of social policy. "I think it
highly desirable," he wrote, "to provide for the shifting of tort damage - the
victims of which are statistically ubiquitous but personally unidentifiable in
advance - from the shoulders of those who are hurt to all society, or to all who
partake of the risk-creating activity producing the harm."' But, second, he
recognized that the systematic introduction of loss distribution was too
monumental a social program for tort litigation to achieve. Holding up the
model of workers' compensation, Gregory observed that "[i]f Mr. James
supported a program of socialization of loss through taxation or compulsory
insurance, preferably administered through quasi-judicial commissions, I would
be most sympathetic." 9 Third, Gregory was not enamoured with tort law,
which he regarded as an archaic mechanism. He recognized that systematic loss
distribution "might mean complete abandonment of tort law as we have known
it," but this, he said, "is not necessarily a condemnation."1 0 Fourth, he
nonetheless held that "[a]s long as we retain this outmoded vehicle, developed
to provide a distribution of loss based on something called fault, I believe we
should honestly recognize its purposes and attempt more perfectly to achieve
them.""
James construed Gregory's adherence to the goal of loss distribution as
narrowing the issue between them. For James, their agreement about the
ultimate desirability of comprehensive social insurance left room for
disagreement only about how to deal with accidents in the interim. For James,
the goal of loss distribution was decisive. He assumed that if the goal was
desirable, it should be implemented to whatever extent possible. Gregory's
defense was "quixotic" in its excessive concern for an anachronistic regime of
liability.
The dispute highlighted two differentjustificatory considerations. Gregory
pointed to the avoidance of unjust enrichment, James to the spreading of losses.
Once Gregory acknowledged both the cogency of loss-spreading and his
antipathy to tort law, James considered the battle over and declared victory.
James assumed that if they agreed on the substantive merit of loss distribution,
they could not reasonably disagree on anything else.

7. Id. at 1178.
8. Gregory, Defense, supra note 2, at 1176.
9. Id. at 1171.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1177.
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James ignored an important aspect of Gregory's approach. Gregory
realized that legal disputes involve more than disagreement about the substantive
merit of different justificatory considerations. Also to be considered is the way
these considerations apply to the legal relationships they are supposed to govern.
Sensitive to this additional dimension, Gregory realized that the goal animating
public insurance did not fit the relationship among joint tortfeasors. The fact
that he wished public insurance to replace tort law did not, in the absence of
public insurance, preclude him from advocating that tort law should more
perfectly reflect its own nature.
To appreciate Gregory's position, one must contrast the role ofjustificatory
considerations in the relational and the instrumental conceptions. In the
relational view, the justificatory consideration is internal to the nexus among the
parties, because it is implicit in the relationship's interior structure. For
example, once one conceives multiple tortfeasors as related through their
common liability to the victim, the idea of unjust enrichment -- in this particular
instance that one tortfeasor should not be compelled to discharge the liability of
all - becomes morally significant simply by virtue of the relationship's
structure. The justificatory force of the principle against unjust enrichment is
immanent to the liability that all the parties to the relationship share. Of course,
contribution among tortfeasors is not the exclusive context for the principle
against unjust enrichment. But that principle operates as indigenously in the
contribution context as it does in any other.
On the instrumental view, in contrast, the normative consideration is
external to the parties' nexus. The favored goal is justifiable independently of
the relationship and then applied to it. For example, James' goal of loss
distribution, which James argued ought to govern the tort relationship, is not a
normative implication of that relationship as such. Indeed, tort law artificially
restricts loss distribution by channelling the loss spreading through the litigants
even though other parties, such as the government operating through its powers
of taxation and redistribution, can spread the loss even more widely. As a
justificatory consideration, loss distribution is compromised by, rather than
immanent to, the structure of the tort relationship. This is why James
championed a scheme of social insurance as the best ultimate solution to the
problem of accidents.
We can sum up the different roles of justification as follows. On the
relational view, justification is internal to the relationship. Therefore, the moral
force of the justification is co-extensive with the relationship that it justifies. On
the goal-oriented view, justification is external to the relationship.
Consequently, the goal's justificatory reach need not correspond to the
relationship's scope.
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From this an important consequence follows. If we regard law as a
justificatory enterprise - that is, not merely as an exercise of official power and
authority, but as a social arrangement that is responsive to moral argument, we
should especially prize the relational conception of tort law. Unlike the
instrumental conception, the relational conception fully respects thejustificatory
nature of law by allowing a justification to function as a justification.
Let me explain this seemingly cryptic remark. A justification justifies: it
has normative authority over the material to which it applies. The point of
adducing a justification is to allow that authority to govern whatever falls within
its scope. A consideration that functions as a justification must be permitted, as
it were, to expand into the space it naturally fills. Consequently, a justification
sets its own limit. For an extrinsic factor to cut the justification short is
normatively arbitrary.
Gregory's point was that the attempt to achieve loss distribution through
tort law is normatively arbitrary. If loss distribution is to function as a
justification, it must be achieved through arrangements, such as taxation or
compulsory insurance, that adequately reflect its justificatory nature. The
channeling of loss spreading through the tortious liability of the injurer
artificially restricts the operation of loss distribution. In a sense, Gregory
accepted the normative implications of loss distributions more fully than James
himself. That is why Gregory was able both to support a program of loss
socialization and to reject the introduction of loss distribution into tort law.
In giving voice to the contrast between the relational and instrumental
conceptions of tort law, the James-Gregory exchange exemplifies the different
ways of connecting relationships and justifications. All instrumental conceptions
of tort law, I believe, have justificatory problems similar in structure to those
facing loss distribution.
Let me draw a very broad conclusion. Perhaps, as Gregory thought, we
should replace tort law with a regime of public compensation. Perhaps also,
more generous provisions of public welfare, especially health insurance, would
alleviate the temptation, so evident in James' writing, to use tort adjudication to
provide what the political process has withheld. But tort law is fundamentally
relational: it presupposes a normative bond that singles out and connects the
particular parties to the litigation. If our project is the reform of tort law, let
us at least remember that it is tort law that we are reforming.
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